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Vol. XVIII. PU2BRUARY, 1920 NO. 4
WRITS vs. RIGHTS: AN UNENDED CONTEST
T is desired in the following pages, even at the expense of re-
peajing much that is already common knowledge, to emphasize
that as yet we are not done with the formulary system of the
common law, despite the fact that codes of civil procedure in most
of our states have purported to end the varied and interesting ca-
reer of forms of action at common law by legislating them out of
existence. However, that legislative edict has been about as effect-
tive as was the famous, but probably mythical, order of King Ca-
nute to the waves of the sea. Certain well-known illustrations of
the ineffectiveness of this legislative action are here offered.
One of the inherent dangers in any attempted classification lies
in the fact that the classification may come to be considered as more
important than the material classified, and that the idenity of
things may come to be determined by the place into which they may
be fitted in some artificial arrangement, rather than by a primary
inspection of the things themselves. The system of actions at com-
mon law furnishes an excellent example of such a classification
which was, and, unfortunately, still is thus misused, even in those
states which, having adopted reformed procedure, should find them-
selves removed from many, even if not all, of the limitations which
beset the lawyer under the older system of procedure. So much
has been said against the evils of the formalism of common law
procedure that it is easy to picture them worse than they really
were and useless to attempt to add new criticism. However, it
may well be remembered that many of the things that we now term
"useless technicalities" were, in their inception, desperate expedi-
ents invoked either to prevent the extinguishment of legal rights
under the preponderant weight of an artificial classification, or to
permit a development, distorted though it often was, of legal ideas
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which could not otherwise have been possible. We have no right to
criticize the early lawyers who, by one device or another, expanded
the action of "case" and multiplied its application in the- recognition
of new rights, and invented the common recovery, the casual eject-
or, the promise implied in law and all the long line of fictions, be-
neficent and otherwise, that mark the progressing development of
the early law.1 But we do have a most decided right to criticize the
modern jurist-who clings to form after the substance is gone, who
takes as a test a classification that once was useful, but which since
has ceased to be significant.
2 To use the language of Professor
Pound :
"Many of the more serious difficulties in our procedure
today result from the persistence of ideas and institutions
which secured important interests before the development
of sulis-tantive law as such, and the detailed working out of
legal rights, but, in view thereof, have no longer a legisla-
tive function."
Our cry should, for example, not be raised against the inventor
of fictions, but against him who continues the application of a 
fic-
tion after it has served every useful purpose, or who diverts it from
the strict purpose for which it was created. We must read Ben-
tham's query, "What can you do with fictions that you cannot do
without them?" in the present and not in the reflexive tense.' True,
as Professor Hepburn saysO posterity was to pay a heavy penalty
for the use of these fictions, but it is still arguable that the penalty
in question has been greatly enlarged by the constant failure to rec-
ognize the fiction for what it in truth is, and by the continual as-
cription of substance to that which has only form! and was never 
in-
tended to have anything else. The legal fiction was and is no neces-
I See. Mitchell. "The Fictions of the LAw." 7 Hazv.,Aw REV. 264.
2 HEpu¢S. "Dzvn.ouZxNT OF CODE PLADI QG" Introduction iiL
' "The Place of Procedure in Modern Law." I SOurHwssTws 
Law R=. 59, 72.
4 SUITE, "SuZviviNa FicrioS," 27 YALz Law JouxxAl, 147, 317.
S"D zv i.,oP uT OF CoDZ PLEADING," pp. 25"30.
* Two examples of contracts iiptied in law at once present themselves.
(a) In those states in which a "thing in action -ot arising out of contract" 
are by
statute not assignable, it is usually held that those torts by which 
the wrongdoer is en-
riched give rise to assOgrabe righ s because the implied promise 
involved makes them
contractual. As stated by one court, referring to such a statutory 
provision: "Evi-
dently this proylsion recognizes the limitation which existed 
at common law when the
code was adopted, and, inferentially at least, provides that a chose 
in action arising
out of a pure tort is not assignable.... .The party injured 
in such a case can waive
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sary part of the system of legal classification, but is a result of the
unyielding nature of the classification hitherto observed in our law.
Fictions should not be considered as having produced dislocations in
the anatomy of the law. Instead, they should be recognized as the
crutches upon which the law was enabled to limp along,.after it had
been lamed by the dislocating effect of classifications rendered ar-
bitrary by strict adherence to forms of action at common law.
As duties and obligations were recognized earlier than the rights
with which they are usually correlative, it was -only natural, per-
haps, that the first great division in classification should be between
the relationships which a man voluntarily assumes and those which
he cannot avoid; the violation of the one class giving rise to contract
wrongs, the other producing the field of torts. Even here one must
be careful not to be led astray by the volitional element, for in per-
haps the larger number of torts a man becomes liable because he
willed to do a. certain forbidden act, and care must be taken to ap-
ply the test of volition at the only proper place where it may be
applied in this field, namely, in the creation of the obligation to act
or not to act, in those cases in which there could be no obligation in
the absence of an intentional choice to be bound. It must be re-
membered that, theoretically, this choice must be made as the first
step in the new relationship, and that it can, in theory, not occur as
a part of the breach of duty or subsequent to the wrong. At the very
outset, then, our classification carries an inherent danger that voli-
tion in the abstract will be taken as the earmark. This has certainly
niade it easier to produce anomalous developments in the field of
implied promises, so called.
Much of the need of reclassification," suggested by writers of the
present day, can doubtless be ascribed to the habit of retaining
obsolete categories derived from ancient procedure. The law is
the tort and sue in contract, and as there was an implied agreement to pay the money,
it was treated as a chose in action arising out of a contract and was therefore asign
able. (K. C. M. & 0. R. Co. v. Shut (x9o9) 24 Okla. 96, ao Ann. Ca& 25S).
(6) It has become customary for the courts and for writers on quasi-contracts to
recognize as a special subject in that field the anomalous "waiver of tort and suit in
contract," in which the courts have given life and force to a non-existent agreement.
See: K ,zz, "Qussr-Coxr acrs," Chap. IM; WoovwAx, "QuAsx-CoxTxAcrs," Chap. XX;
Corbin, "'Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit" x9 YALx LAw Jomuw., 2a1 WooDayw,
"'CAss ox QuAsz-Cowrtxcrs," pp. s7-639; Kz]lt, "CASEs ox QrASx-CoXrTRAM,- Chap.
VI; Timasrox "Casm ox Quasx-CoraxAcrs," Chap. VIL
TFor a discussion of such need. see Smith "Tort and Absolute Liability.-Suarested
Changea in Clsasificadon," 3o HAZv. L Rxy. 241, 319, 40.
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already over-complex,' and the complexity daily increases. The
time is already long past when we should have ceased to add con-
fusion to that complexity, by harking back to spurious or obsolete
tests and classifications.- This becomes evident to the reader of
the current reports of any of our American jurisdictions, where it
is quite usual to find the court pronouncing a right to be contractua
because it is to be secured or protected by an action, such as at com-
mon law would have been designated as an action in a.sszmpsit,'
0
and declaring that wrong to be delictal which could at common law
be redressed by one of the recognized tort actions." With all due
deference to the honorable ancestry of our rules of law, it is here
submitted that in any such test the cart has been put before the
horse, and that such a deductive process is, from a logical stand-
point, hardly more satisfactory than the old example, which was
familiar to all of us when in college. "A horse has four legs. The
animal which I see before me has four legs. It is, therefore, a
horse."
Conceivably this method of thought belongs in the same class
with that type of mental habit,
11 which makes a fetish of certain
combinations of words, and continues, long after they have lost
their original significance, to repeat obsolete formulas in the solu-
tion of present day legal problems. It is not correct to refer to
such rule-of-thumb deduction as "logic," unless by the term "logic"
you refer to the mere mechanics of thought, with no reference what-
ever to correctness. True logic must seek truth, and we must re-
ject as illogical any result which gives unmistakable evidence of a
lack of verity.
The serious aspect of the whole matter lies in the fact that new
classes of rights cannot be -ormed and new rights cannot develop
a So complex have our society and its laws become as to give strong grounds for
the contention that this complexity has become tantamount to 
a denial of justice to those
financially unable to employ skilled lawyers to expound 
those intricacies. Report of
Reginald Heber Smith, for Carnegie Foundation, "Jusmxc Aw0 Twz Poot." 
31-32.
, Haxv. . Ry. at p. a4S---f'ort and Absolute Liability," cited above. Here Pro-
fessor Smith cites: YMkxz, "'AxCrINT LAW," (I Eng. ed.) a; MArr-ATrl. 
'ErT= A31D
Fo-vS o Acxiox," 296; CAuzsEL, "Pssxcrsmz or ExG.sa Law" (19o7), 245; 
Pro-
fessor Salmond in 1 .L. QUART. REv. at p. 13.
wAs typical of the language of the courts, see: K. C. M. & 0. 
v. Shutt, note 6
above:-"such violation partakes not only of the nature of a tort, but of an implied con-
tract. beilg in the Itaure of wsumpsit?"
u-See Cotbin, "Quasi-Contractual Obligations," 2x YALE LAw JouR. 
S33, 536.
2S"Lswyers and judges fall into habits of mental 'indolence 
and take for granted
the absolute correctness of legal rules, and apply them mecanically."-Swayze, 
"The
Growing Law.' as YALz Law Joua. at p. x4.
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freely as long as we insist upon referring everything to the old
categories for our tests and classifications. Legal institutions ought
not forever to be hampered by that historical inversion, in which
there was a recognition of remedies first, and legal rights after-
wards,13 thus casting legal rights in an arbitrarily patterned mold.
One of the grievous disappointments awaiting the over-sanguine
student of code procedure lies in the discovery of how far the code
has missed its great ideal, because of the failure to discriminate
between the elements which inhere in rights themselves and those
things which were engrafted upon the ideas of rights by the for-mulary system of the common law. The fact that code procedure
appears as an evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary step in
legal development may be an explanation of the carrying over of
many common law notions, which would better have been discarded,
but can be no excuse for the translation of those notions.
The familiar language of Professor Salmond, will certainly bear
repetition.1"
"Forms of action are dead, but their ghosts still haunt the
precincts of the law. In their life they were powers of evil,
and even in death they have not wholly ceased from troubling.
In earlier days they filled the law with formalism and fiction,
confusion and complexity, and though most of the mischief
which they did has been buried with them. some portion of it
remains inherent in the law of the present day. Thus, if we
open a book on the law of torts, however modern and ra-
tionalized, we can still hear the echoes of the old controver-
sies concerning the boundaries of trespass and trover and de-
tinue and case, and we are still called upon to observe dis-
tinctions and subtleties that have no substance or justifica-
tion in them, but are nothing more than an evil inheritance
from the days when the forms of action and of pleading
held the legal system in their clutches."
WHAT IS THn FINAL STEP IN THE RECOGNITION OF A LcAr, RTGHT?
As the content of the term "legal right" has already been fixed
by careful analysis, it is not considered possible to improve upon
the generally-accepted definition, which may be paraphrased as fol-
lows: A right is that capacity, recognized or created by law, in
one individual to influence the conduct of others, to effectuate
3 
STiREE, "FOXNDATIONS OF L=AL LI Awl3r," Vol m, p. 3.
121 L. OVART. REV. 43.
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which the power of the state may be invoked.' 5 Or to use the lan-
guage of BouviER's LAw DiCTIONARY.
"The idea of claim and that the claim must be well found-
ed always constitute the idea of right .... .The idea of a
well-founded claim becomes in law a claim founded in or
established by the law, so that we may say that a right in
law is an acknowledged claim."
Professor Salmond says.16
"It is to be noticed that in order that an interest should
become a legal right it must obtain not merely legal protec-
tion, but also legal recognition."
The element here to be emphasized is that the condition precedent
to the existence of new rights is the fact of recognition. That the
development of society continually forces the recognition of new
rights can be thoroughly demonstrated by a consideration of the
changes which have occurred in the law regarding business compe-
tition, during the past fifty years. Any fixed or inelastic classifica-
tion, then, must be a stumbling block to advancement, and any test
which secures all its categories from the past is bound sooner or
later to be found barring the way to further advances. As pointed
out by many eminent writers, the common law classifications did
warp the law of the past, which was serious enough, but to permit
the law of the future to be twisted awry by past errors is immeas-
urably worse. -This historical test by which we allow or deny
rights depending upon whether they do or do not accord with past
conceptions allows for no mistakes of classification, and can cloak
itself behind nothing more substantial than a plea of uniformity.
To which it must at once be said that it is a poor kind of consistency
which can be attained only by the perpetuation of mistakes. Con-
sistency is, of course, necessary in any system of laws, but care must
be taken to see that it is a real and not an apparent consistency
which we have attained. If we cannot change the past we can at
n Pouxv, "READINGS IN THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW," 413.
SALMONr,, "JURISPRUDNCE ,' (3d. ed.) 184-187.
PouLocx, "FIRST BooK oil JURISPRUDENCE." (3d. ed.) 63.
AUSTIN, "JURISPRUDENCE" (sth ed.) Vol. I, 282-285.
HOLLAND, "JURISPSuDENCE." (xith ed.) 82.
MARxBY, "ELEMENTS OF LAW," (6th ed.) 92-93.
" 1JURiSPRUDENcE," I86.
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least do what we can to modify the effect of that past upon our
future.
While you can not say positively that a right exists until the
power of the state (presumably through a court) can be exercised
in its behalf,'- it is going one step too.far to say that since no known
form of action lends itself to the securing or protection of the right
there is no right which it is possible to recognize and it is clearly a
misconception of the law in code states which have declared that
"common law forms of action have been abolished, but common
law causes of action have not," ' which permits such a statement to
be, either directly or impliedly, construed into a statement to the
effect that the causes of action recognized at common law contain
all of the kinds of rights which may be recognized under the
codes.1"
CAUSES OF ACTION: RmFCT. ov HISTORICAI PROCEDURAL NOTIONS
UPON THEIR DEFINITION
In view of the fixed conservatism of the legal profession it is not
surprising that the coming of code pleading should have been re-
ceived by two distinctly opposed factions.20 One of these feared
wide innovations as threatening to break down the whole system of
the law. The other hailed code procedure as a panacea for juristic
ills. The one clung steadfastly to the system of fixed actions as the
guide and teacher of their lives, while the others, too optimistically,
perhaps, foresaw a completely rational re-classification of legal
rights resulting from the removal of the trammels of fixed forms
of action.
The natural result of the clash between these two ideals has been
a crop of anomalous positions which are not consistent with either
the spirit' of the code or the technical exactness of the older sys-
tem. One of the better examples of the effect upon the definition
of legal ideas is found in the application of the term "cause of
lISALmOND, "JURISPRUDENCE!" (3d. ed.) 335"336 (Damnum mit injuria); PHI.
LIPS, "CoDE PLEADING," sees. 27, 389, 390.
BLISS, "CODE PLEADING." (3 d. ed.) see. ixi.
ISPHLL IpS, "CODE PLEADING," .Jec. x62: BLISS, "CODE PLEADING,' secs. s. 6;
PONSMoY, "CODE REmEDIzS," sees. 4-14; and notes under all of the above sections.
'The difficulty with the classification by actions at common law lies In the fact that
those actions were not mutually exclusive. See Corbin, "Waiver of Tort, etc.," i9 YALx
LAW 'OUs., 221. 223.
"POMEROY, "CODE REMzDIES," sec. IS and notes.
HXPsuiN, "HIsToxY OF CODE P..ADIO," sees. 82-83.
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action," which Mr. Phillips points out 2' has suffered in its word-
ing a loss of exactness. The term, he says, can be applied only
when called a "cause for action."
Here we find two distinct points of view, both of which find ex-
pression in the English case of Brunsden v. Humphrey,22 which has
received much attention from the American courts. In that case
the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the defendant's ser-
vant, who drove a van against the plaintiff's cab, damaging it and at
the same time injuring the plaintiff. In a previous action the plain-
tiff had recovered some four pounds for injury to the cab and that
judgment is here pleaded in bar of the action for the personal in-
jury. The trial court held the judgment to be a bar, on the theory
that there was but a single wrong. On appeal, the court was called
upon to decide whether there was more than a single cause of action
involved. The court, speaking through Bowen, L. J., says, in part:
"According to the old distinctions of forms of action
which still have a historical value as throwing light upon the
principles and definitions of the common law, the forms of
action upon such an hypothesis would have been trespass to
the person for personal injury, trespass to goods for the
damage to the vehicle. Injury would have been done to the
plaintiff in respect of two absolute and independent rights,
the distinction between which is inveterate both in English
and in the Roman law. . . .Two separate kinds of injury
were in fact inflicted, and two wrongs done. The mere
negligent driving of itself, if accompanied by no injury to the
plaintiff, was not actionable at all for it was not a wrongful
act at all till a wrong arose out of the damage which it
caused. One wrong was done as soon as the plaintiff's en-
joyment of his property was substantially interfered with.
A further wrong also occurred as soon as the driving also
caused injury to the plaintiff's person. Both causes of action
in -one sense may be said to be founded on the act of the de-
fendant's servant, but they are not on that account identical
causes of action."
32 "CoDE PLEAvxNu," sec. 31.
22L R. 14 0. B. D. 741 (C. A.)-(2884), S3 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 476, S' L. T. N. S.
S29, 32 Weekly Rep. 944, 42 J. P. 4.
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Lord Coleridge, C. J., dissented vigorously, using the following
language:
"It appears to me that whether the negligence of the ser-
vant or the impact of the vehicle, which the servant drove,
be the technical cause of action, equally the cause is one and
the same. That the injury done to the plaintiff is injury
done to him at one and the same moment, by one and the
same act, in respect of different rights (i. e., his person and
his goods), I do not in the least deny; but it seems to me a
subtlety not warranted by the law that a man cannot bring
two actions if he is injured in his arm and his leg, but cal
bring two, if besides his arm and his leg being injured, his
trousers which contain his leg and his coat sleeve which con-
tains his arm have been torn."
It will be observed that Lord Coleridge is referring to physical
causation and not to the legal cause of action, and that he has used
the term "plaintiff's person" with the most extreme exactness and
does not include within it even those things which are so closely
associated with one's person as to reasonably be considered a part
of it. The exact line is, of course, hard to draw upon this test of
reasonableness. Still, it is no more difficult to make such a dis-
crimination upon that ground than it is to determine what the "un-
warranted application of force" shall amount to in order to be an
actionable interference with one's person. Hard cases do make bad
law, but they do so quite as often -because of the failure to make
reasonable distinctions or definite analysis, as they do because of
excited sympathies. Close discrimination is not always "unwar-
ranted subtlety."' '
The case of Brunsden v. Humphrey seems to reflect well the two
• It ought to be reasonably clear that there is a difference in relationship between a
man and the clothes he is wearing, as compared with a bundle of clothing or other
property of which he may be possessed, though even here it is arguable in technical
strictness that there is no difference. But is there a difference between the case where
a train hits a drove of cattle and negligently kills five of them, and the one where the
train through the same basic negligence kills five animals each a mile from the next
one, and the possible case where one animal was killed because of the same negligence
on each of five days? Metaphysically speaking the only difference lies in the length-
ening of the interval of time and space. As a matter of "every day common sense"
there is a decided difference. Lord Coleridge invokes the very subtlety of which he
complains.
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divergent attitudes. With proper respect for traditions and his-
torical development Justice Bowen carefully observes the analysis
of a cause of action into its proper elements; (a) the right of the
plaintiff, (b) the duty of the defendent, and (c) the wrongful act
of the defendant which produced the breach of that duty. He does
not permit his analysis to be led astray by procedural tests or mat-
ters of supposed better policy. On the other hand, starting with a
misapplication of the term "cause of action," which he takes to mean
the particular act which precipitates the law suit" Chief Justice
Coleridge proceeds to misapply the maxim, "Nemo debit bis z'exari
pro una et eadem causa." There is no rule that a man may not
twice be punished for the same act. The rule provides for a single
punishment for a single wrong, and a wrong is the violation of a
right. The conclusion of the majority of the court must be taken as
the better reasoued. while the, dissent can be charged with an un-
warranted shift of emphasis in magnifying the importance of the
wrongful act. Because of the remedial elections open under the
older system, it was easy to lay the stress where Chief Justice Cole-
ridge has here placed it, and to fail to recognize in those actions in
which actual damage is the gist of the wrong, that loss is after all,
not the only important element involved. Damage or loss, as such,
is nothing. Neither is important until coupled with some correla-
tive right and duty.25
It is just this attempt to correct a wrong by patching up its re-
sults, rather than seeking the source from which that wrong springs
that has produced a large number of incongruous situations in our
law. Under the formulary system, it must be admitted, the courts
were fortunate to be able to deal even with the result in those cases
in which the cause was hard to reach because of the classification,
or in which the procedure, if one started from the right itself, was
inadequate. This inverted attack was, however, adopted in some
cases in which it might have been avoided, with the result that the
spurious remedy, thus created caused the recognition of pseudo-
rights, having no real relation to the exact wrong done or the true
uOchs v. Pub. Serv. R. C. (ipxg), 81 N. 3. L. 66r, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 24o, Ann.
Cas. xoxz D. 2ss. overruling 8o N. . L_ iso.
AHoriaxi, "Juxisitunz.,cz," (iith ed.) Chap. VIMI.
SALxoxo, "JuRzISMzUcE " (3d. ed.) %Us.
Poummor, "ConZ RzIaEzxS:" (4th ed.) se- 337, 417.
PRIujt., "CoDZ PLUADI G."' See. 3o.
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right violated.2 6  One such field, already referred to,2 7 is found in
the field of quasi-contract.
Justice Coleridge seeks a desirlable end in seeking a rule which
will minimize the number of law suits that may be brought to re-
dress the wrongs arising out of any single act, but, as there can be
no possible objection to a procedural rule under reformed proced-
ure requiring an injured party to join in one suit all the causes of
action which accrue to him on account of any single wrongful act
of another, there is a most serious objection to the means which he
adopts to reach this end. Judge Coleridge would continue to make
rights subordinate to procedure. He would compel a joinder of
causes by breaking down all clasc;fications of rights, fundamental
though they might be. He would prefer to extinguish a right rather
than vary a rule of procedure. This is striking back into the dark
ages of the law with a vengeance!
Writers on jurisprudence have uniformly asserted that the rights
of a person over persons and the rights of a person as to property
were, of necessity, distinct things.28  A multiplicity of suits is cer-
tainly to be preferred to the extinguishment or the merger of neces-
sarily distinct legal rights. Reformed procedure, in England as in
America, was supposed to have relegated procedure to its proper
position as secondary to legal rights. It is repugnant to modem de-
velopment to seek again to enthrone procedure and to permit it
again to reign as by divine right.2 9
In America, the dissent. of Lord Coleridge has received probably
more approval than the majority opinion.30 This reception would
seem from an opinion3 1 rendered many years before the case of
Brunsden v. Humphrey, was due to an already existing failure to
recognize fundamental rights as such. In that case the court says:
"It is a complaint in which the plaintiff has made the neg-
21 Corbin, "Waiver of Tort and Suit in Asumpsit," i9 YALE LAW JOUlNAL., 221-224,.
23.5.
21 See note 6, above.
38 HOLLAND, "JU ISPRtUDENCE," (sith ed.) r32-740.
SALMOND, "T URISPRUDENCE," (3d ed.) s9o.
PouN.D, "READINGS, ETC., IN THE COMMON LAW," 420.
MAxKY, "ELmENTS Or LAW," (6th ed.) secs. z6z-x67.
AUSTIN, "JuRsspituvoscE," (sth ed.) 367 ff.
"For a discussion pointing out the inherent fallacy in the position taken by Chief
Justice Coleridge, see PHILLIPS, "CODE PLEADING," SeCs. 30, 31, 440. 441. Particular
attention is called to the note under section 3o.
0See notes: so L. R. A. x6z: 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240: Ann. Cas. X912 D. 255.
n'Howr V. Peckham, (x8s'x), io Barb. 6s6; 6 How. Pr. 229.
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ligence of the defendant the ground of action, and in which
the damage both to the plaintiff's person and his property are
claimed as the consequence of the negligence or as resulting
from the negligence complained of .... The party injured
has an election either to treat the negligence of the defendant
as the cause of action and declare in case or to consider the
act itself as the injury and declare in trespass."
At this point let it be remarked that the election referred to is
purely remedial in its nature and that it has nothing whatever to do
with fundamental rights . 2  The shadowy border-land lying be-
tween case and trespass was created by the joint action of the ar-
bitrary limitations of the formulary system and the rapid expansion
of "case" after the Statute of Westminster II. The wrong in-
volved is the invasion of the right over property or the right to
personal immunity from harm, and its existence does not necessarily
depend upon either the element of directness of force or that of
negligence of action. In fact, the element of negligence was seized
upon to permit the action of case to be brought. The result in the
instant case is that the court is misled into the notion that a differ-
ent right is involved where the negligence is treated as the cause of
action from that in which the act itself is considered the cause of
action. Here we have the key to the shift in emphasis which, in
Brunsden v. Humphrey, led Chief Justice Coleridge astray, as it
has many of the American courts. The opinion proceeds:
"The running against the plaintiff's, carriage in the high-
way, and breaking it and upsetting the plaintiff and injuring
him by the careless negligence of the defendant, never con-
stituted but one cause of action, and for which the plaintiff
recovered his damages as well for his personal injury as for
injury to his property. This is a salutary rule for when in-
jury has resulted both to the person and the property of the
plaintiff from one single act of negligence of the defendant
the law ought not to be guilty of so great folly as to compel
the plaintiff to sustain the burden and expense of two suits
to recover his damages."
The "folly," if any be present, belongs to the court. The fact
n'"The practice sometimes indulged in even by courts in their solemn judgments of
retaining the ancient nomenclature and of describing a given cause as "trespass" "tro-
ver," "as=psiuh and the like is productive of confusion and confusion alone."-Pox-
anoy, "Cona Rsxm=," (4th ed.) sm 49.
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that the rules as to joinder of causes, which were in force at the
time of this case, might require two suits is certainly not a sufficient
excuse for wiping out fundamental iegal classifications. If there
was a serious multiplicity of suits, the legislatures should have been
depended upon to remedy the difficulty, when it was called to their
attention. The court should have refrained from legislating. Fur-
ther, the very reason for the rule regarding the joinder causes,
referred to by the court as producing a multiplicity of actions for
one "wrong," is the fact that there are two wrongs involved, which
are essentially different in their nature. The fact that there is such
a statute forbidding their union is conclusive evidence of legisla-
tive intent to recognize dnd keep distinct the two kinds of rights.U
The position of this court is therefore wholly inconsistent.
This case of Howe v. Peckham is typical of perhaps the greater
number of American cases, but in none of the cases reaching this
conclusion are there any serious attempts to analyze the rights in-
volved,3' the courts being content usually to announce that there
" This precise application was made in the case of Schermerhoen v. Lo Angeles
Pac. R. Co. (qzsa), i8 Cal. App. 454, citing: Lamb v. Harbaugh, zos Ca 680, (1895),
and Thelin v. Stewart, zoo Cal. 372, (1893).
"The cases most often cited are:
King v. C. M. & S. P. R. Co. (:goo), go Minn. 83, 8: Am. St. Rep. a38, so L. I.
A. 161 and note.
Kimball v. L. & N. R. Co., 94 Miss. 405 (19o9).
McAndrew v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co. (1893), 70 Hun. 46, 23 N. Y. Sup. 1o74.
Rosenberg v. Staten Island F. Co. (1891), 38 N. Y. S. Rep. so06, X4 N. Y. Sup. 476.
Doran v. Cohen (:888). 147 Mass. 342.
Broithweite v. Hal (897). z68 Mass. 38.
B. & 0. R. Co., v. Ritchie, 31 Md. x9r.
Cole's Admr. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. (z9o$), so Ky. 686.
Wheeler Savings Bank v. Tracy, 14T Mo. z2S, 64 Am. St. Rep. Sos.
Von Fragteis v. Windier (876). 2 Mo. App. 398.
Stickford v. St. Louis (2879). 7 Mo. App. 217.
Lamb v. St. L. C. & W. R. 7o., 33 Mo. App. 489.
Mobile &' Ohio R. C. v. Matthews (896). zis Tenn. *72.
Bliss v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. (2994), :6o Ma 447, 64 Am. St. Rep. So4.
In the case last cited, the authorities given seem not to be in point, since in each
of them the injury arose from a single act by which a number of articles, of the same
nature, in a group were converted. Only one right, the right over property, was vio.
lated and these authorities are not the best of support where the rule is to be extended to
a case in which two Idnds of property and two distinct inds of rights are involved.
A case frequently cited in support of Howe v. Peckham (6 How. Prac. a29) is
Chicago West Div. R. Co. v. Ingrahom (:89o), 131 Il3. 69. This case turns upon a
pure question. of pleading and not upon any question of substantive rights. It might
readily be argued in opposition to rather than in support of that case. The Ingraham case
holds that since, where both the plaintis property and his person were injured by the
same wrongful act, the plaintiff, at his option, could have brought wholly separate suits,
or could have combined the two in one action, by placing them in separate counts, it
was only a formal defect (duplicity) to have merged them in a single count. As th de-
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can be only one suit for a single wrongful act, leaving it to the read-
er to guess whether they have been led astray by procedural expe-
diency, or by historical misconceptions, or both, though now and
then a court frankly admits that its decision is based upon mere ex-
pediency.35
The leading American case following Brunsden v, Humphrey is
the case of Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Company,35 which, overruling
previous contrary decisions, holds:
"While some of the difficulties in the joinder of a claim
for injury to the person and one for injury to property in
one cause of action are created by our statutory enact-
ments, the history of the common law shows that the distinc-
tion between torts to the person and torts to property has al-
ways obtained. Lord Justice Bowen has pointed out"5 that
there is no authority in the books for the proposition that a
recovery for trespass to the-person is a bar to an action for
trespass to goods or Vice versa."3
The rule of the California case of Hutchinson v. Ainsworth"9 of-
fers the only test which may safely be used if any logical classifi-
cation of legal rights is to be attained.
fendant pleaded merely the general issue he was held to have waived the right to ob-
ject to a matter of form. This case does not hold that there is but a single cause of
action.
Foss v. Whitehouse (19o), 94 Me. 498, presents interesting facts. Plaintiff was
arrested and placed in jail for failure to pay taxes which he claimed he had already paid.
To secure his release he finally did maite the payment demanded. Thereupon, he-brought
two actions: (r) to recover the money so paid, and (a) to recover damages for the im-
prisonment. The court held a recovery in the first case to be a bar to the second action,
treating the extortion as aggravation of the -imprisonment. It is not difficult to find
fault with this decision, since the plaintiff is the only person who has the right to merge
the extortion into and treat it as aggravation of the arrest and imprisonment, which pre-
ceded it.
"Mobile &S" 0. R. Co., v. Matthews (z9o6), irs Tenn. 172.
3 (1902). x7o N. Y. 40. .57 L. R. A. 176. 88 Am. St. Rep. 636, overruling: 43 N.
Y. Sup. 536, 14 App. D. 242; and 52 N. Y. Sup. 817, 3 App. D. 302.
"In Brunsden v. Humphrey. cited in note 22 above.
" Accord: Watson v. Texas & Pac. R. Co. (1894), 8 Tex. Civ. App. r44.
Ochs v. Pub. Sere. R. Co. (ipii), 8z N. J. L. 66, 36 L IL. A. (N. S.) 240, and"
note.
King v. Railway Co. (x9o6). 126 Ga. 794, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) S44. -
Boyd v. Atlantic Coast L. R. Co. (1914), 2i8 Fed. 653.
Eagan v. N. Y. Transp. Co. (1902), 39 Misc. x1, xx N. Y. Ann. Cas. 394, 78 N.
Y. Sup. 209.
Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R. Co. (r912), 18 Cal. App. 454.
73 Cal. 452.
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"The facts upon which the plaintiff's right to sue is based
and upon which the defendant's duty has arisen, coupled with
the facts which constitute the latter's wrong make up the
cause of action. If these facts, taken together, give a unity of
right, they constitute but one cause of action."
Tests based upon procedural history or upon past procedural
convenience must be abandoned, if it is at all possible to do so.
PROMISES IMPrID IN LAW: THEIR CoNvusIoN WITH AcTuAL
PROMISES
After the discussions of this subject by Professors Ames."0
Corbin,4 and Smitha there remains very little indeed that can
profitably be said without unnecessary repetition, about the func-
tion of this fiction.
Attention is called to the statement by Professor Ames in the ar-
tide referred to:
"The history of assumpsit, for example, though the fact
seems to have escaped general observation, furnishes a con-
vincing illustration of the vitality of mediaeval condeptions."
It is, however, desirable to emphasize the origin and function of
the promise in law, which is, even now, rather too often mistaken
for one variety of actual promise. In the article by Professor Cor-
bin it has been clearly indicated that all contracts are in reality
implied contracts, since a contract depends upon the mental state
of the parties, which can be arrived at oidy by deduction from" their
words and other acts. Only the contracts implied in fact are to be
considered as true contracts and it is to be remembered that the
contract implied in law is no true contract of any description." So
far from arising by consent or intention is it, that it can be said
never to appear save against the will of him who is to be charged,
and in its very inception it lacks that element of consent which goes
to make up every true contract. The reasons for the invention of
the implied promise are to be found in the vogue attained by the ac-
tion of assumpsit. Its parentage is purely procedural. It was
a sstory pf Assampsit a HAxv. L" Riv. z. S3.
-- waiver of Tot and Suit in Assumpit" z YALZ Law Jouwt, 22z.
"Qimi.CortractuI O ations." 2r YA.Z LAw JOUiL, S33.
a Survivifz Factions." 27 YALz Law Jou., 324-327.
a 1 9 Y.Z Law Joi.. 221.
Ams "Esstou of Assumpit," a HAv. L 1rv. at p. 63.
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brought into existence by the mere fiat of the court, and usually
to redress a wrong tortious in nature.' 5 It finds its source in the
law of remedies and not in the law of rights."8 Historically it ex-
ists merely for the purpose of adding elasticity to the administra-
tion of law by the courts. It is one of those surviving fictions' 7
for which we are even now paying penalty, because of the ten-
dency to treat it, without careful consideration, as a true contract. 8
Such treatment is found in its use as a test of the assignability of
choses in action under statutory provisions forbidding the assign-
ment of a "thing in action not arising out of contract," 49 and as per-
mitting the right to "waive the tort and sue in contract."
The reason for the existence of the contract implied in law was
well stated by Mr. Swayze :"'
"We hold men to implied contracts,51 but the implied con-
tract is a mere fiction devised by the courts of law to do jus-
tice where justice is impossible in the strict conception of
contract or tort. As in the earlier days the action of assum-
psit was based upon the theory of a tort and by means of a
fiction a recovery was permitted upon the theory that the
failure to perform the contract was in the nature of tres-
pass, so we have come to allow a recovery when money ought
to be paid ex aequo et bono upon a fiction of a con -act that
never existed." 2
Woovw,mD, "QuAsi-CoxT crs," secs. x, 4.
9KmEa, "QUAS.-CONTRACTS," 14.
"See 27 YALE LaW JOUIL, 324 i0. where Professor Smith cites copious authori-
ties in this field.
" "Since like contracts proper they (promises implied in law) were enforced by
means of the action in assumpsit, it is not surprising that in a period in which sore im-
portance was attached to forms of action than to the nature of substantive rights the
essential dissimilarity of the two obligations was not observed. The persistent failure to
recognize it, however, has resulted in confusion and error and in many cases has wrought
serious injustice. It can not be too strictly emphasized, therefore, that quasi-contracts
are in no sense genuine contracts."--WoowanA "QUAss-CoNrTAcvs,' section 4.
"Had not this almost self-evident proposition (that in waiving the tort and suing
on the promise implied in law, the act does not ceale to be tortious) been lost sight of,
because of the fiction of a promise involved in the action of indebitatus assumpsit when
brought to enforce a right of action not resting on a contract, much of the confusion in
and conflict of decisions now existing would have been avoided."-KwEER., "Quxs:-
CowTLcrs:' 16o.
"See note 6. above. Similar examples found in Kas"e Midland R. Co. v. Brehm
(1895), S4 Kans. 75S, and Challiss v. Wylie (x886), 35 Kans. 5o6.
"o "The Growing Law," as YAxz LAw JOuI. at p. 4.
"Clearly this must mean contracts implied in law.
S2 See, also, AMEs, "HIsTOY OF ASSUMsIT," 2 HAXV. L. REV. at p. X4.
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With a majority of our states announcing in their codes of civil
procedure that all forms of action have been abandoned and all fic-
tions in pleading abolished, it would seem that the fiction of the
promise implied in law should lose some of its standing in the courts,
and certainly shoild not be extended in the slightest degree beyond
its present bounds. Reformed procedure has largely removed the
need for this "mediaeval conception," which being false in its very
inception should be cast out as soon as its purpose is served. From
the standpoint of the exact recognition of basic rights it is to be re-
greted that our courts have not more carefully observed the admo-
nition of Lord Mansfield, who may be given almost sole credit for
the wide use made of the implied promise- 3
"But fictions of law hold only in respect of the ends.and
purposes for which they were invented: when they are used
to an intent and purpose not within the reason and purpose
of the fiction, the other party may show the truth."54
Many of them would have great difficulty in telling us just why
they invoke a -falsehood when the truth would do better, and why,
they retain an obstacle to symmetrical classification, which tends
by giving an erroneous reason, to prevent the investigation of funda-
mental principles underlying rules of law.55
WAIVER OF TORT: A NEEDLESS ANOMALY
This judicial falsehood continues to be used widcly in A hat -p-
pears to be a growing field, despite the fact that its extension in this
direction was never demanded by any true necessity. The coutts
seem more and more inclined to invoke in their decisions this anoma-
"Finally under the influence of Lord Mansfield the action (on the implied prom-
ise) was so encouraged that it became almost the universal remedy where the defendant
had received money which he was obligated by ties of natural justice and equity to re-
fund."--A rs. "Hisoxy or A.suwrsrr," 2 HARV. L. REV. at p. 68.
" Morris v. Pugh, 3 Burr. 244.
w Smith, "Surviving Fictions," 27 Yasz LAw Joui., T48.
"There are several fictions still exercising powerful influence upon English ju-
risprudence. . . .but there can be no doubt of the general truth that it is unworthy of us
to effect an admittedly beneficial object by so rude a device as a legal fiction. I can-
not admit any anomaly to be innocent, which makes the law either more difficult to un-
derstand or harder to arrange in harmonious order. Now, among other disadvantages,
legal fictions are the greatest obstacles to symmetrical classification. The rule of law
remains sticking in the system, but it is a mere shell. . . .Here there is at once a
difficulty in knowing whether the rule which is actually operative should be cast in its
true or its apparent place, and minds of different casts will differ as to the branch of
the alternative which should he selected."-MAiNE, "AscxrT LAw," (toth ed.), pp.
26. 27.
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lous "waiver of tort and suit on contract" doctrine, which seems
now to be permanently imbedded in our law. However, if in the
law today there is any field, which, more than another, seems to con-
tain a fiction that has lost any utility it may ever have possessed,
that has outlived the supposed procedural needs which brought it
into being, that has always served as a clog on clear analysis and
logical classification, that tends to prevent an investigation of fun-
damental principles, that, by giving an erroneous reason, makes it
h.rder Ee understsnd and apply the rule of law'involved, the field
is the one in quasi-contract commonly designated "waiver of tort"
The cases in the field of quasi-contract can be divided into two
main types. One type arises because a new right or duty is strug-
gling for recognition. The other type arises because, struck by a
mere surface similarity, the courts have carried over a false pro-
celural method to -a field in which its adoption was wholly unnec-
essary. The second field is the field of "waiver of tort" The first
comprises, at present, all the other obligations arising out of un-
just enrichments.
Of the origin of -quasi-contracts Profegsor Keener says-
"The question naturally arises why a classification pro-
ductive of so much confusion was ever adopted. The ans-
wer to this question is to be sought, not in the substantive
law but in the law of remedies.
"The only forms of action known at common law were ac-
tions of tort and contract. If the wrong complained of would
not sustain an action, either in contract or tort. then the
plaintiff was without redress unless the facts would support
a bill in equity.
"Although from time to time the judicial view of sub-
stantive rights broadened under the leavening effect of equity
and other cosiderations, the broadening precess did not ]cad
to the creation of remedies sounding in neither contract nor
tort. The judges attempted, however, by means of fictions
to adapt the old remedies to the new rights, with the result
usually following the attempt to put new wine into old bot-
tles ..... The insuperable difficulty of proving a promise
where none existed was met by the statement that 'the law




obligation would not have met the situation since the action
of assumpsit presupposed the existence of a promise."
With this sort of a history what is more natural than that the
courts should seize upon the procedural test as the earmark of the
underlying right and, without investigating the nature of the rights
underlying the so-called "unjust enrichment," prozeed by Lhe same
forms in all cases where ingenuity could find a way to construe an
implied promise from the facts in hand ?3T This was the line of least
resistance, for
"It is easier for the courts to say that a man is bound to
pay because he must be taken to have promised, than to lay
down for the first time the principle that he is bound to pay
whether he has promised or not."58
It is evident that one of the reasons for the use of fictions was to
cloak the fact that the court was legislating, or to conceal an incon-
sistency produced in the law by the new rule. 9 What were the con-
siderations which moved the court to apply the equitable theory
that one should not be permitted to profit by his wrong to a field
already sufficiently covered by the actions of replevin, trespass and
trover? If the owner desired restitution of his property he could
use replevin. If he wished damages for interference with his chattel
or land he might bring trespass action. If he sought the value of his
goods appropriated by another the action of trover was open. The
antecedents of the rule are apparently shrouded in doubt.
"The equitable principle which lies at the foundation of
the great bulk of quasi contract, namely, that one shall not
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another has estab-
lished itself very gradually in the common law. Indeed, one
seeks in vain today60 in the treatises upon the law of contract
for an adequate account of the nature, importance and nu-
merous applications of this principle." 61
I? "Incidentally, it must be noted that this resort to fiction sometimes relieved the
court from giving reasons for the existence of an obligation (from inquiring carefully
into reasons for imposing absolute liability.)"--Smith "Surviving Fictions." 27 YALz LAw
JouL at p. 326.
* SA.uoNDo "JuzzsauaDxcz," (3d ed.) 440.
'MIczL, "Tix FzcrboNs or THE LAW," 7 Hsxv. L. REV.. 249, 262.
*'This was written in x888. The texts by Professors Keener and Woodward have
since appeared.
n Augs, "Hisroxy or AmsumPSIT." a Hxxv. L. Rzv. at p. 66.
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At the time of an article by Professor Wigmore12 the field now
designated as the "waiver of tort" was either not recognized as a
division of quasi-contracts or else that writer considered its inclu-
sion improper. In that article he says:
"A quasi-contract right or a right of restoration is the
right to obtain restoration of a benefit or the equivalent there-
of conferred by the claimant, but unjustly detained by the
defendant."
3
Further, in this article he points out that the quasi-contract arises
in three classes of cases:
(A) MISRELIAN"c: The injured party acted because he was
misled by the apparent relations of the parties.
(B) COMPULSION: Where a contract, obtained through com-
pulsion is set aside, recovery is to be had for any payments which
may have been made.
(C) CIRCUMVENTION: Fraudulent dealing by the defendant
by which he has gained a benefit.
The use of the word "conferred" and the choice of the classifi-
cation as indicated, in which the volitional element on the part of
the person who claims restitution is clearly apparent, indicates to
the present writer that Professor Wigmore then believed that quasi-
contractual obligations arose only when the one now claiming res-
titution, parted with his property vzoluntarily, and that where it was
taken from him against his will only a tort existed. This, in the the
mind of the present writer, is the only logical view.
There is ample argument to show that the commonly accepted
notion that there is a right to waive the tort and sue in assumpsit is
decidedly illogical.
I. The tort cannot be waived. It is the universal opinion of
writers on this subject that the tort can never be dispensed with:
that it must always be present as the "inducement" for the implied
promise.6 '
""A Summary of Quasi-Contracts" (1891), 2s Am. LAW REv., 69s.
"See note 62.
4"The tort is. however, waived only in the sense that a party having a right to sue
in tort or assumpsit. will not, after he has elected to sue in asiumpsit. be allowed to sue
in tort. By such an election, that which was before the election tortious does not cease
to be so. Tn fact, when the assumpsit is brought, it is only by showing that the defend-
ant did a tortious act that the plaintiff is entitled to recover. There being no contract
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2. Disseisin: Plaintiff's rights do not change. If Professor
Ames is right in hig doctrine of disseisin of chattels"
5 the owner of
a chattel ceases to be the owner whenever the chattel is taken from
his possession, and has in its stead only a chose in action. If he has
ceased to be the owner and has only a chose in action which will be
satisfied by the return of the chattel or its equivalent, then it is clear
that his right of action must be defined at the instant of the taking
and that it can not be changed by anything the wrongdoer may do
with the property subsequently.
3. Plaintiff's injury is a constant factor.. It is evident that if
B is deprived of his chattel by A's act, he is injured in exactly the
same way in each of the three possible cases, viz., (a) A takes B's
chattel and sells it, appropriating the proceeds, (b) A takes B's
chattel and retains it, and (c) A destroys B's chattel. In the first
case B is generally permitted to rely upon the invasion of his prop-
erty right or may sue upon the fictitious promise implied in law.
In the second case he probably has the same election, though writ-
ers on this subject seem to have had some doubts.
0 6 In the third
case he can base his action solely upon the invasion of his property
rights. Either this is illogical or writers on jurisprudence have been
sadly in error. The right invaded was the right of property. When
this right was broken it ceased to be a right and became a chose in
action; a new right, by which the former owner is entitled to re-
cover the property, if it be recoverable, or its value. If thereafter
there was no contact between the former owner and the wrong-
doer, it is hard to see how any new or different obligation arises.
merely because of something which the wrongdoer did after he
between the parties, unless the defendant is guilty of some wrong, the plaintiff can es-
tablish no cause of action against him."--KENER, "QHASI-CoNmTAcr," x6o.
"The phrase 'waiver of tort,' commonly used to denote the election of assumpsit, is
unfortunate. It implies that the swrong is waived, which is both inaccurate and mis-
leading." -WoowARD, "QuAsi-CoNTxAcrS," sec. 271.
"In such cases as this it must certainly be admitted that the obligation arises out
of a tort. But for the defendant's tort he would be under no obligation; and the plain-
tiff must allege and prove the commission of the tort in order to win his case, whether
his action is in trover, or trespass, or assumpsit."-Corbin, "Quasi-Contractual Obliga-
tions," 2r Y.LE LAw JouR., S33, 537.
"No trick or ledgerdemain on the part of the plaintiff can change the tort into a
contract. Neither can the law do this. The law may allow new forms of action and may
call things by new names, but it cannot turn a theft or other conversion of qnods into
an innocent agreement to sell and buy."-Corbin, "Waiver of Tort," etc., 59 YALE LAw
JOUR., 22!. 226.
. See the article under that title. 3 1"v. L. Rrv., 23.
KEENER, "QUAsI-CONTRAc-s," pp. 92-ig$ and cases there cited.
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had completely lost contact with the former owner, whose injury
is not by such an act varied in the slightest.
4. Statute of Limitations. The statute of limitations forces the
recognition of a further inconsistency, upon which there is a diver-
gence of opinion. The period of limitation upon contract actions
(the implied promise) is longer, usually, than that fixed for tort
actions. This led Professor Keener to hold that suit might be
brought upon the promise after the action upon the tort had been
barred."7 It was also his opinion that the unjust enrichment dated
from the sale or barter of the property taken thus extending the
period far beyond the normal limits of either the limitation on con-
tracts or that on torts. The basic incorrectness of this position has
already been made clear by Professor Corbin," who points out that
since the former owner's rights were but once invaded, there can
be but one period of limitation, logically speakipg, and that must
be the one applicable to the tort action.
5. "The doctrine of waiver of tort is siniply the election of remi-
edies."' 0  It being conceded that there was only one violation of a
right, and that that violation was a tort,70 the only question which
confronted the common law jurist was the question of what form
of action to choose. The fictitious promise was invented to give hini
a further choice. It is probable that there was no misunderstanding
of the purpose and effect of this fiction when it was first used.
However, the evil and inveterate habit of our lawyers has been to
continue to describe the new things in the terms of the old, and
then to clothe the old terms with some of t-heir old meaning, and to
add in this way elements not belonging to the new rights at all. Noth-
ing has been more common than to lay hold upon a chance turn
of ancient procedure and with it to demonstrate the existence or
non-existence of legal rights. There can be no question that our
modem assertion that the wronged party acquires a new right be-
cause of the unjust enrichment of the tortfeasor is nothing more
than a process of legitimatizing the natural offspring of a mismated
"QuAsz-CoNTIc'r," 177 1t.
xO YALz LAw JoujL. 221, 236, 237-
KECHNE, "QVASI-CONTRACT,' 159.
To "With equal propriety, therefore, when an election is made to sue in tort, onecould say that the ouasi contractual relation is waived. It is usual to speak of waiverof tort only for the reason that the remedy in tort is the older." Keener, "Quasi-con.
tracts" z59. But this statement can be correct only when limited to a procedural choice
and cannot be extended to mean a choice between actually co-existent rights.
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procedural pair. The implied promise came into existence as an
aid to procedure, to protect and redress rights already infringed,
not to declare new rights. We have here, then, one of those char-
acteristi:, and rather too-frequent blunders, in which form is mistak-
en for substance.
6. Obligations may e.rist without rights, bit rights cannot exist
without obligations. Writers and judges have been. prone to de-
clare, as above indicated, that waiver of tort and suit upon the ;m-
plied promise finds its basis in a new right. The argument upon
which this conclusion is based is that the party who is enriched at the
expense of another "ought" to pay back the enrichment. From this
wq have argued backward, upon the fallacious notion that behind
an obligation (here assumed) there must be a right. But for the
misleading effect of procedural forms this inversion could not have
taken place, for if the deduction commences with the primary right,
as it logically must, no such secondary right can be conceived of.
From this angle such a right is as much out of place as is the
"fourth dimension" to the average layman, and equally without use.
Yet the statement is constantly made that a new right has arisen.
The writer feels that this is wholly untrue, and that it is impossible
for such a right as is thus asserted ever to have arisen in a scheme
of rights not ruled by arbitrary procedural conceptions.
7. The true basis of the doctrine of unjust enrichment is the
feeling that no man should be permitted to profit by his wrong.
The implied promise was invented to prevent this unjust enrich-
ment in cases where there was no existing remedy. Being equita-
ble in its nature, it should, like other equitable doctrines, not be
invoked where there was already a direct and adequate remedy in
tort. The excuse for the fiction fails" and it should therefore find
no application in a field, where the identical relief introduced by
the employment of the fiction, viz., compensation in money already
existed. This reason alone should have rendered the recognition
of "waiver of tort" impossible.
8. The waiver of tort doctrine merely provides two measures
of damage where but one existed before. As pointed out by Pro-
fessor Woodward. 72 it is more logical to say that there is only one
primary obligation that is violated, and that the injured party has
71 KEENER. "QUASI-CONTRACTS," 211.
" "QuAsI- CONTRsAcTs," sec. 27o.
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two measures of redress, commonly _called "damages" and "restitu-
tion." The pairing of these two terms is the unfortunate result of
the misconception of the effect of procedure upon substantive rights.
The word "restitution" is prejudicial to clear analysis. If there
is but one right violated, such as the possessory right in a chattel,
the owner is immediately invested with a chose in action, and in
the case of the chattel may seek to recover the chattel or its value.
The return of the cattel itself is the only restitution presently pos-
sible. If the owner seeks redress in money he is not seeking resti-
tution. He seeks indemnity, and the only question presented re-
fers to the measurement of that indemnity. The owner can say,
"The property was reasonably worth so much to me," and can use
this as his measure of indemnity. - Or 'he can say to the wrong-
doer, "You have benefited so much by appropriating my property.
You can not deny that its value was as much as you have bene-
fited." Then the "enrichment" measures the recoverable amount.
Whatever may have been the situation in the past, this is obviously
more in harmony with modern conceptions and classifications, than
is the customarily announced rule of dual rights.
Professor Corbin has expressed "grave doubts as to the pro-
priety of this doctrine" of waiver of tort.78 This is mild language
to apply to a doctrine which never had more than the very slightest
justification, the existence of which can be explained only as one
of the illogical conditions produced by misapplied historical tests
in determining legal rights.
Whole-hearted agreement must be accorded the statement by
Professor Keener, that:"-
"The continuance of such a fiction (existing for the pur-
poses of a remedy only) cannot be justified, to say nothing
of its extension in those jurisdictions where all forms of ac-
tion have been abolished. In such jurisdictions the inquiry
should be, not as to the remedy formerly given at common
law, but as to the real nature of the right."
And Professor Corbin's statement" should receive equal ap-
proval:
"In jurisdictions where the old forms of action have been
"i YALE LAw Joum at P. 245.
14 "QuAsi-Coic.Acrs," 16.
ig YALz LAw JouL at p. 246.
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abolished, there should be nothing whatever left of the old
doctrine excepting a few historical echoes."
The difficulty lies, however, in the fact that in the jurisdictions
having reformed procedure we are still harking back to the an-
cient tests without proper regard for their present day value. We
continue to use the ancient and unnecessary phraseology and to
perpetuate the errors of the past.
CAN A LIMIT BE PLACED ON HISTORICAL TEsTs?
The tenacity with which set habits have in the law resisted erad-
ication makes one extremely doubtful of the coming of sweeping re-
forms in classification or analysis. Sixty years of reformed pro-
cedure has not materially changed the trend of legal thought in
this respect and yet there is here and there a sporadic case which
may be taken as an indication that certain modifications are in the
making.
The somewhat recent Montana case of Eisenhauer v. Quinn8
presents an excellent example for our consideration. The problem
presented by that case, with details omitted, is approximately this:
If A takes B's house and affixes it to C's land, with or without C's
knowledge, and C then sells the land to D, a bona fide purchaser,
can B replevy the house from D? The Montana court stands al-
most alone"7 in its rule allowing the action, and at first glance the
case offers a decided shock to the legal sensibilities and the impulse
is to condemn the holding without reservation. Further considera-
tion ought to modify the first impression and should point out that
much of the aversion to the doctrine announced is due to tenden-
cies inherited from past procedure.
Analysis of the objections places them in two general groups (a)
those arising from property law, and (b) objections arising out of
procedure.
" 36 Mont. 368, 122 Ant. St. Rep. 370. 14 L. R. A. (N. S.), 435 (19o).
'
T
Russell v. Richardr (z833), 10 Me. (z FairE.) 429, 26 Am. Dec. s3"2, and note.
Hamlin v. Parsons (866), z2 Minn. zo8, go Am. Dec. 284.
Shoemaker v. Simpson (1876), 16 Yans. 43.
Central Branch R. Co. V. FrtX, 20 Kans. 430, (semble).
Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., v. Cronk (1892), 93 Mich. 49, (semble).
Mills v. Reddick, z Neb. 437.
Huebschmann v. McHenry, 29 Wis. 6sS, (semble).
Also statements in 2 Au. & Exa. Exc. o LAw, Vol. 13, p. 68r, and Tir-
PANY, "REAL PRoPErTY." 537.
Compare Eluoes Y. Mawe (:802), 2 SuiTH'S LEADING CASES (7th Am. ed.) 177,
and note thereunder.
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Enumerating the objections arising out of property rights :78
i. The house has lost its identity and cannot, therefore, be spe-
cifically recovered. This loss of identity may be a fiction and wholly
untrue in fact. It is probably subject to identification and, since it
was moved on to the land, it is possible to move it off, unless it has
been affixed to that degree that it cannot be removed without ex-
cessive damage to the freehold. If it can be so identified and so
severed, there is, from a legal standpoint, no insuperable obstacle to
permitting it to be specifically recovered.
2. A bona fide purchaser should be protected against claims
as to which he has no notice. Hie'is not so protected in the purchase
of personalty. There is no special sanctity which surrounds a pur-
chaser in good faith, as such. The doctrines of negotiable instru-
-ments and equity have had a tendency to place him in rather a higher
plane in our imaginations than he occupies in the law. The doc-
trine of caveat emptor still applies to an unattached chattel, and,
other things being equal, there is no reason why it should not apply
to fixtures capable of identification and removal. Our general con-ceptions, however indicate that things are -not equai in this field,
and to date we have favored the purchaser of land as against theequally innocent party who has been despoiled of his personalty.
It is easy to see, if the law were to be re-written, we might invoke
the other well known doctrine that, if either of two innocent parties
must suffer, he who has elected to change his position must bear the
loss. On such a theory, it would seem just and proper to say that
D, who has reposed trust and confidence, and has, in that trust and
confidence purchased from C something which C had no right to
sell, should be asked to have recourse to C for recompense and that
B, who is wholly innocent and was wholly inactive, should be placed
in statu quo. To such a solution it is no objection to say that it has
never been done, a thousand precedents to the contrary, whether
procedural or otherwise, should be unavailing if society has de-
veloped to the point where the rejection of the old doctrine of fix-
ation and the adoption of the new rule seems desirable for the pro-
motion of the general good of society. Certainly the suggested
position is not without some good features, and much of our ob-
" As it is not intended to argue for or against the validity of any of the substantiverules of property regarding fixtures no authorities upon the existence or non-existence of
these rules are here offered.
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jectidn under this head comes from a reluctance to abandon concep-
tions hitherto accepted.
3. The rude is contrary to public policy reflected in the record-
ing acts. We should not compel every purchaser of real estate to
trace the lineage and descent of every specific, severable improve-
ment upon the land which he is buying. Upon this point the in-
quiry becomes chiefly one of fact. Will the use and alienation of
real estate be unreasonably impaired by such a rule? Will general
development be retarded? Will investments be rendered insecure?
Does it require the prospective purchaser to do the impossible and
does it place him in a position where he cannot possibly protect him-
self,? Is it so inconsistent with the spirit of the recording acts as to
compel its rejection? These and kindred questions involve mat-
ters of fact and opinion upon which there may be a difference of
judgment, but which really involve little or nothing of legal the-
ory or classification. The question is merely one of the needs of
society. The respect for the recording acts is not absolute, at best,
and many exceptions already exist. The Montana court must be
held to have passed upon these questions and to have resolved
therefrom that public policy permitted or possibly demanded the
abandonment of the traditional rule regarding fixtures. If issue is
to be taken upon this point, it must be remembered that the question
is upon a matter of fact and-not upon a question of legal theory.
Procedural objections are:
i. You can not try title to rea! estate by the action of replev-
in. Why? The authorities denying the right are legion. What of
it? It is true beyond question that the action has never been gener-
ally so used, but there is no reason, since the formulary system has
ceased to be an object of worship, why the action of replevin should
not be adapted to any question cognate to the question of possess-
ion, and, if in the type of case suggested we suppose in addition that
A removed the house from land which B claims to own, there can
be no fatal objection to trying B's title to tluzt land, incident to the
n As typical of these cases, see:
Martin v. Thompxon. 62 Cal. 618, 4s Am. Rep. 663.
Hines v. Good, z28 Cal. 38, 79 Am. St. Rep. 22.
Anderson v. Halper, .34 Ill. 436. 8S Am. Dec. 318.
King v. Mason, 42 Ill. 223, 89 Am. Dec. 426, with note.
Snyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawle, 423. 2z Am. Dec. 466.
Huebschmann v. McHenry. 29 Wis. 6SS. See for collection of cases:
EWELL, "Fix-ruREs" (2d ed.) 624 (417); Baoso. "FIXTIRS:' 379; 19 CyM.
1073: ii R. C. L. 1o91; TIFFANY, "RES.. Popmrmy," .536, S37.
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determination of his right to retake the house. Historically, it was
not done, but history should have no conclusive weight where pres-
ent conditions call for the recognition of new rights or demand new
procedural rules and methods.
2. Some equitable remedy should be invoked; constructive
trust, for example. Why? Is not our objection based upon an un-
willingness to modify property laws and to vary the effect of the
recording acts? Is there any reason why we should call to our aid
another fiction and introduce one more sinuosity into our already
over-devious legal paths? If the owner of the chattel has any rights
worth recognizing there is every reason for giving that recognition
directly, rather than indirectly. There is no reason why we should
with time-honored conservatism continue our ancestor worship and
again bow down before the formulary system. Such is our first
impulse, but it is an inherited trait. There is no excuse for flying
to the shelter of equity to escape the ghosts of the past. If there
is no proper action at law, why not invent one? Or, if an adaptable
one exists, why not adapt it? The old notion of seeking relief in
equity merely because the law does not now provide in its defective
machinery proper remedies, belongs to the dark ages of our law.
It is part and parcel of a very dead, but as yet unburied past.
Therefore, without attempting to attack or justify the conclusion
reached by the Montana court, it seems fair to say that the de-
cision shows a commendable freedom from the fetters of precedent;
that the willingness of the court to recognize a new right directly
and simply and without the camouflage of fictions or the cloak
of procedural indirectness augur well for a progressive and sym-
pathetic development and application of the law to meet the needs of
the present day.'0
In conclusion, it is clear, as the foregoing illustrations show, that
the purely historical test is unsafe; that its use, even to the extent
"A somewhat similar field is presented by the case of The Brig Mary Axn, "ed.
Cas. 12.142- 21 Fed, cas. 432, 2 Sutmn. 2o6, aiarmed 3 Pet. 387, tO L. ed. 213. (183S).This case declares, without giving reasons, that a dispossessed owner has a property right
in his chattel, which is something more than a non-assignable chose in action. If followed,
this decision would, of course, run counter to thp thing which Professor Ames desig-
nated "the disseisin of a chattel." (See that subject, 3 HAtv. L. Rtv. z3 and see also
"The Inalienability of Choses in Action." SEzzcr EssAYs ON ANGLo-AmEstscmtc LxGAL.
HIsToRv, vol. III, p. so7). Here again the desirability and practicability of the doc-
trine proposed to be substituted must not be iudged by conditions of the past. Posses-
sion in the law of property, of course, has been a matter of subreme importance, but
that is no sufficient reason for saying that, beyond question, it must always remain so.
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which has been customary in the past is unwise; that the 
develop-
ment of the law must be too slow and often distorted 
if the ideals
of the past are alloWed? to keep out. those of the present. 
An ex-
amination into the history of a rule is valuable as explaining 
how we
reached the point at which we find ourselves, but is 
certainly no ex-
cuse for remaining there forever. In an age of airplanes 
much of
our law still travels by ox-teams, and no small part 
of that back-
wardness is caused by an unwillingness to furrow new 
fields or by ail
automatic retracing of furrows already drawn in unproductive 
land.
A decent respect for the past we must always have, and 
an un-
derstanding of the development of the law, to the end that 
we may
apply the rules of law in their true spirit. 
But we have rather
too long been content to sit within the Chinese wall of 
precedent,
mumbling prayers to the procedural gods of our fathers. 
New
rights must be developed under new conditions. It 
must not be
considered fatal if these rights are-not, absolutely in harmony. 
with
all of the existing system. When our law becomes wholly 
harmo-
nious, development will have ceased. And though we in 
America
do echo the sentiment:
"If the English law is ever to assume an orderly distri-
bution it will be necessary to pare away the legal fictions,
which in spite of recent legislative improvements are still
abundant in it."8
1
We must, in all honesty, confess that the assertion that
"the last vestige of the fictitious, principle will die out
when the need to resort to it has ceased.
82
is still nothing more than an unrealized, pious hope, and 
we also
must recognize that legislative fiat has been decidedly insufficient
as a means' of terminating, or even greatly modifying the untoward
influence of past artificial classifications.
LYMAN P. WirsoN.
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"U .z, "AwcIENT LAW" 27.
0 Mitchell. "The Fictions of The Law," 7 HAxv. L. R3-v. at p. 255.
